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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3419 
 ___________ 
 
 ALHAJA OLUMUYIWA, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A073-045-713) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Donald Vincent Ferlise 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 18, 2011 
 Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  May 20, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Alhaja Olumuyiwa petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals‟ 
(“BIA”) denial of her motion to reopen.  We will deny the petition. 
I. 
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 Olumuyiwa is a citizen of Nigeria who entered the United States without 
inspection in 1992.  She applied for asylum claiming persecution on account of her 
Muslim religion.  An Immigration Judge denied her application and ordered her removal 
to Nigeria, and the BIA dismissed her appeal in 2002.  The BIA concluded that, although 
Olumuyiwa suffered past persecution, the Government showed that she could safely 
relocate within Nigeria, including to its capital city of Lagos.  Olumuyiwa did not petition 
for review.  Instead, she filed a motion for reconsideration, which the BIA denied.  
Olumuyiwa petitioned for review of that ruling, and we denied her petition.  See 
Olumuyiwa v. Ashcroft, 95 F. App‟x 432 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 Over six years later, and after having been detained by the Government, 
Olumuyiwa filed with the BIA the motion to reopen at issue here.  Olumuyiwa presented 
evidence that she has converted to Christianity since coming to the United States.  She 
also submitted various articles and country reports describing increased violence between 
Muslims and Christians in Nigeria.  She argued that she now fears persecution both by 
Muslims on account of her conversion to Christianity and by Christians who will 
continue to impute her former Muslim religion to her. 
 The BIA denied her motion by order issued August 5, 2010.  The BIA held that 
none of Olumuyiwa‟s evidence calls into question its earlier ruling that she could safely 
relocate to Lagos.  It also noted that her conversion to Christianity is a changed personal 
circumstance that is not a basis to reopen.  It further reasoned that Olumuyiwa‟s evidence 
shows merely the continuation of conditions that persisted at the time of her previous 
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hearing.  Finally, it concluded that Olumuyiwa had not shown prima facie eligibility for 
relief.  Olumuyiwa petitions for review.
1
 
II. 
 Olumuyiwa‟s primary argument on review is that the BIA did not adequately 
address the evidence she presented in support of her motion to reopen.  We agree that the 
BIA‟s discussion of that evidence, in which it failed to mention any item in particular, 
leaves something to be desired.  See Zheng, 549 F.3d at 267-68.  The question ultimately 
before us, however, is whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying reopening.  We 
cannot say that it did. 
 Olumuyiwa‟s motion to reopen was untimely because she did not file it within 
ninety days of the BIA‟s previous decision.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(c)(2).  Thus, to obtain reopening, she had to present material evidence of 
“changed country conditions arising in” Nigeria.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  The BIA held that Olumuyiwa‟s evidence does not qualify for several 
reasons.  We find one of them dispositive. 
 In its initial decision, the BIA held that, although Olumuyiwa had shown past 
                                                 
1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We review the BIA‟s denial of 
reopening for abuse of discretion and may not disturb its ruling unless it is “„arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.‟”  Zheng v. Att‟y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 264-65 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citation omitted).  We review the BIA‟s underlying assessment of the record 
for substantial evidence and must uphold it unless “„any reasonable adjudicator would 
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.‟”  Liu v. Att‟y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 
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persecution, the Government rebutted the resultant presumption that she has a well-
founded fear of persecution by showing that she could reasonably relocate within 
Nigeria, and to Lagos in particular.  (Aug. 21, 2002 BIA Dec. at 2) (A.R. 173).  In its 
present decision, the BIA held that Olumuyiwa had presented no evidence “challenging 
the Board‟s decision relating to [her] ability to relocate in Lagos” and that her evidence 
“does not refute the fact that relocation is possible.”  (Aug. 5, 2010 BIA Dec. at 1-2) 
(A.R. 3-4).  Although its discussion of this issue is fairly cursory, it is adequate for us to 
review its ruling.  See Toussaint v. Att‟y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 414-15 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 Olumuyiwa has not raised any persuasive challenge to that ruling.  She does not 
cite any evidence calling it into question, and our own review of the record has revealed 
none.
2
  Instead, she argues that the BIA erred by requiring her to show that she could not 
relocate because, in light of her past persecution, the burden is on the Government to 
prove otherwise.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii).  That argument misperceives the 
current procedural posture.  Olumuyiwa is seeking reopening, so she must show that 
changed circumstances in Nigeria call the BIA‟s previous ruling into question.  Her 
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 Some of Olumuyiwa‟s evidence reports a recent escalation of violence between 
Muslims and Christians in parts of Nigeria, primarily in the city of Jos near the 
country‟s center (A.R. 123-125, 141-44), but none of her evidence mentions any 
religious-based violence in Lagos.  The only statement in the record arguably 
suggesting the potential for such violence is the statement in the 2009 International 
Religious Freedom Report that “[a]cute sectarian violence in the Middle Belt served 
to heighten tensions between religious groups even in parts of the country that did not 
experience the violence.”  (A.R. 143-44.)  That isolated reference to “heighten[ed] 
tensions . . . in parts of the country” does not compel the conclusion that Olumuyiwa 
cannot safely relocate to Lagos.  
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evidence does not do so.  She further argues that it is not safe for her to relocate to Lagos 
because her twin sister was killed there in 1996, in what she believes to be a case of 
mistaken identity, but she raised that argument in her underlying proceeding and the BIA 
rejected it.  She cannot challenge the BIA‟s underlying ruling at this stage.  See Camara 
v. Att‟y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009).  Finally, she argues that the BIA 
erred by stating that it is “possible” for her to relocate to Lagos instead of considering 
whether it is “reasonable” for her to do so.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B).  Once 
again, however, the BIA was referring merely to the lack of evidence calling its previous 
ruling into question.  It was not ruling on the issue in the first instance. 
 In sum, Olumuyiwa presented nothing requiring the BIA to revisit its previous 
ruling that the Government met its burden to prove that she can safely relocate to Lagos.  
That ruling remains dispositive of her claim.  See id.  Thus, the BIA did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that Olumuyiwa failed to show changed country conditions that 
warranted reopening.
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 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
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 Because Olumuyiwa did not show that changed country conditions warranted 
reopening, the BIA correctly held that she was not eligible to file a successive asylum 
application (as in fact she did not) on the basis of the change in her personal 
circumstances brought about by her conversion to Christianity.  See Liu, 555 F.3d at 
150.  We note that the BIA previously held that both Christians and Muslims can 
safely relocate within Nigeria.  (Aug. 21, 2002 BIA Dec. at 2) (A.R. 173).  
Olumuyiwa has not presented any evidence that country conditions have changed in 
that regard. 
